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ABSTRACT 
 
Prior research has shown that executives can significantly influence firm tax 
strategy.  However, we know little about the consequences of executive influence on 
firm tax strategy.  I examine labor market consequences, which capture the financial and 
reputational consequences of executives’ actions.  I find that executives face negative 
labor market consequences when they influence firm tax strategy.  This finding is 
consistent with executive influence on firm tax strategy signaling to the labor market that 
executives are focusing on non-core activities of the firm.  Further, this negative 
relationship is stronger among executives whose performance and characteristics are 
uncertain to the labor market as the labor market seeks additional information regarding 
these executives.  These results are robust to alternative proxies of executive influence 
on firm tax strategy and alternative proxies of labor market consequences.  By 
examining labor market consequences, I provide evidence of the consequences of 
executive influence on firm tax strategy.  This study also furthers our understanding of 
how the labor market values and evaluates executives. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In an attempt to better understand the wide variation of tax avoidance across 
firms (see Dyreng et al. 2008; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010), recent research has begun 
examining the influence executives have on firm tax strategy.1  Dyreng et al. (2010) 
examine whether top executives influence the tax avoidance component of tax strategy 
in a way that cannot be explained by firm fixed effects or other firm characteristics.  
They find that executives influence tax strategy and attribute this influence to executives 
setting a ‘tone at the top’.2  However, Dyreng et al. (2010) left two important questions 
unanswered regarding executives and taxes.  First, they do not explore the consequences 
to executives who influence firm tax strategy. Second, they do not identify when 
executive influence on firm tax strategy is relevant to others.  I answer these questions 
by examining the labor market consequences of executive influence on firm tax strategy. 
I define labor market consequences as changes in the opportunities executives 
have in the labor market as a result of their actions.  Labor market consequences affect 
the executive’s future financial rewards and prestige.  I focus on labor market 
consequences rather than compensation because prior research has shown that tax 
avoidance can directly influence executive bonuses (Gaertner 2014) and equity holding 
                                                          
1 By firm tax strategy, I refer to the overall tax goals or policy of the firm and not to particular tax 
transactions or schemes.  Tax avoidance would be one tax strategy: to minimize current tax payments.  
Other tax strategies might be to have consistent tax outcomes or to minimize investment in tax planning. 
 
2 Consistent with the findings of Dyreng et al. (2010), I define executive influence on firm tax strategy as 
an executive having an unusual and consistent impact on firm tax strategy regardless of firm incentives 
and structure. 
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values (Rego and Wilson 2012; Seidman and Stomberg 2012; Armstrong et al. 2014), 
which could cloud tests of executive influence on tax strategy, and compensation may 
not capture the prestige of different jobs in the labor market.  Fee et al. (2013) document 
that boards of directors can observe executive influence on various firm policies and 
make hiring decisions accordingly.  Thus, it is reasonable to believe that boards of 
directors and other decision makers in the executive labor market observe and respond to 
executive influence on firm tax strategy.3  By examining labor market consequences of 
executive influence on firm tax strategy, I can determine whether executives are 
rewarded or punished for influencing firm tax strategy.   
Prior research suggests that executive influence on firm tax strategy could matter 
in some situations and not others and could lead to positive or negative labor market 
consequences.  One stream of research finds mixed results about the outcomes of 
different tax strategies (Desai and Dharmapala 2009; Wilson 2009; Kim et al. 2011; 
McGuire et al. 2013), suggesting that no single tax strategy is preferred and would be 
rewarded by the labor market.  Rather the labor market may respond to executives who 
influence firm tax strategy as a signal of an executive characteristic regardless of which 
strategy the executive is encouraging.   
A second stream of research suggests that choosing a tax strategy is not a core 
activity of most firms (Porter 1985; Quinn 1999; Contractor et al. 2010) and therefore 
should not be the focus of executives as this could lead to poorer firm performance.  
                                                          
3 In discussions with an individual from an executive search firm, they had no doubts that an executive’s 
influence on firm tax strategy could be known in the labor market.  Further, they said that it can come up 
in interview questions and is something the search firm can identify. 
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Thus, the labor market should reward executives who focus on the firm’s core activities 
(e.g., setting overall firm strategy or determining new products/services) and penalize 
executives who focus on non-core activities such as tax strategy (Ananthalakshmi 2013; 
Sheahan 2013; Tuttle 2013).4  
A third stream of literature based on agency theory suggests that executive 
influence on firm tax strategy should have positive labor market consequences because 
executives are responsible for maximizing the return to shareholders using all means 
available to them within the bounds of the law (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and 
Jensen 1983).  Consistent with this idea, prior research shows that executives who 
improve firm performance have positive labor market consequences (Tosi et al. 2000; 
Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Fee and Hadlock 2003).  Because different tax strategies can 
create economically significant cash savings to firms (Mills et al. 1998; Scholes et al. 
2009), executives who influence tax strategy can optimize the investments in tax 
planning and increase cash flows.  This increased cash return to shareholders should lead 
to positive labor market consequences. 
A fourth stream of literatures suggests that the labor market may ignore an 
executive’s influence on firm tax strategy in some circumstances but actively seek and 
use information about executive influence on firm tax strategy in other circumstances 
(Gulati and Higgins 2003; Ilmola and Kuusi 2006).  I expect active searching for 
executive influence on firm tax strategy to occur when there is uncertainty regarding an 
                                                          
4 Dyreng et al. (2010) suggest that executives can influence firm tax strategy via ‘tone at the top’: making 
hiring decisions, setting compensation and budgets, etc.  Even if this takes little time or effort of the 
executive, it still is a signal that they are focusing on non-core activities and could lead to negative labor 
market consequences. 
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executive’s performance and characteristics (Reilly and Conover 1983).  In these 
situations, executive influence on firm tax strategy may signal information about the 
executive’s characteristics or performance not otherwise known to the labor market.  
Therefore the labor market consequences to executives’ influencing firm tax strategy 
should be strongest among executives whose performance and characteristics are 
uncertain. 
To determine the labor market consequences of executive influence on firm tax 
strategy, I first estimate executive influence on firm tax strategy using executive fixed 
effects, requiring executives to work for at least two firms (Dyreng et al. 2010).  I then 
determine if executives who influence firm tax strategy are more likely to be promoted 
than those who do not, using appropriate executive and firm characteristics as controls. 
I find that executives who influence the variation of firm tax strategy are less 
likely to be promoted compared to executives who do not influence the variation of firm 
tax strategy, holding firm performance, other firm characteristics, and executive 
characteristics constant.  This finding is consistent with the notion that executive 
influence on firm tax strategy is a signal of a non-core activity focus.  In addition, I find 
that the labor market consequences are stronger when there is uncertainty about 
executives’ performance and characteristics.  This finding is consistent with executive 
influence on firm tax strategy being fully considered by the labor market when there is 
uncertainty about the performance and characteristics of an executive.   
I conduct a number of additional analyses to test the robustness and 
generalizability of my results.  I use an alternative methodology to estimate executive 
5 
 
influence on firm tax strategy, and find that my results are generalizable to executives 
who work at only one firm.  I also find that executives who influence an alternative non-
core activity also face negative labor market consequences.  Finally, I demonstrate that 
my results hold among firms implicated in a tax shelter.  Using Gallemore et al.’s (2014) 
sample of tax shelter and matched firms, I find that executives who leave firms that are 
implicated in a tax shelter have more negative labor market consequences than 
executives who leave firms that are not implicated in a tax shelter.  This is of particular 
note because Gallemore et al. (2014) find no reputational consequences of a firm being 
implicated in a tax shelter including no changes in executive turnover even though recent 
survey evidence suggests that there should be reputational consequences to tax shelter 
activity (Graham et al. 2014). 
My study contributes to three literatures. First, this study furthers the literature 
discussing the consequences of firm tax strategy choice. Prior research suggests both 
positive and negative consequences to firms because of their tax strategy choices (Desai 
and Dharmapala 2009; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009).  I demonstrate that one consequence 
of firm tax strategy choice is negative labor market consequences for executives who 
influence firm tax strategy.  Second, my study furthers our understanding of executives 
influencing firm choices.  My findings verify that firms’ tax strategies differ because of 
executives’ idiosyncratic characteristics and not just because of firm characteristics, 
supporting the executive fixed effect methodology.  This study furthers our 
understanding of the role executives play in firm tax strategy by suggesting that 
executives who influence firm tax strategy are not focusing on the core activities of the 
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firm.  Also, I provide evidence that the labor market detects and responds to executives’ 
influence on firm tax strategy. 
Third, this paper contributes to the executive labor market literature.  I 
demonstrate that the labor market responds negatively to executives whose influence on 
firm tax strategy suggests that they focus on non-core activities of the firm.  I also 
demonstrate that the executive labor market evaluates how an executive achieves firm 
performance (core vs. non-core activities) as well as the level of performance.  Further, I 
demonstrate that when an executive’s characteristics or performance are uncertain, the 
labor market seeks additional information about the executive, including information on 
their propensity to influence firm tax strategy. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Executive Influence on Firm Tax Strategy 
 Historically, most accounting and corporate tax research has assumed that 
executives are homogeneous and react similarly to incentives (Bertrand and Schoar 
2003).  However, accounting and tax research has recently started acknowledging and 
studying the influence of individual executives.  For instance Bamber et al. (2010) 
document that individual executives have unique firm disclosure preferences or style 
(see also Davis et al. 2014).  Ge et al. (2011) demonstrate that CFOs influence specific 
firm accounting choices such as accruals and pension accounting.  Li et al. (2010) 
demonstrate that individual CFO’s professional qualifications relate to the likelihood of 
receiving an internal control weakness opinion and the probability of improving internal 
controls. 
 Consistent with this literature, Dyreng et al. (2010) document that individual 
executives have an economically and statistically significant influence on firm tax 
strategy.  Executives influence tax strategy by setting the ‘tone at the top’: allocating 
firm resources, setting compensation incentives, and making hiring decisions (Robinson 
et al. 2010; McGuire et al. 2014).  Dyreng et al. (2010) provide evidence that 12.2 
percent of executives substantially influence firm effective tax rates (ETRs).5  
                                                          
5 Specifically, Dyreng et al. (2010) find the 12.2% of executives have a statistically significant (p-value < 
0.05) fixed effect when estimating GAAP ETR. 
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Executives influencing firm tax strategy can increase or decrease ETRs by 15 to 20 
percent.   
 Contemporary with and subsequent to Dyreng et al. (2010), there is a growing 
literature examining the relation between executives’ incentives and firm tax strategy.  
For instance, prior research has found equity incentives of CEOs and CFOs (Rego and 
Wilson 2012), after-tax compensation (Gaertner 2014), and high powered incentives 
(Desai and Dharmapala 2006) are associated with higher levels of tax avoidance.  
Neuman (2014) demonstrates that the executives’ incentives affect whether firms focus 
on minimization or sustainability tax strategies.  These studies could suggest that 
executive influence on firm tax strategy is a function of incentives, does not represent 
idiosyncratic executive characteristics, and should not be valued in the labor market.   
 Conversely, a number of papers have examined how specific executive 
characteristics influence firm tax strategy.  Executives’ personal tax aggression (Chyz 
2013), overconfidence (Chyz et al. 2014), political affiliations (Francis et al. 2012; 
Christensen et al. 2014), military background (Law and Mills 2014), narcissism (Olsen 
and Stekelberg 2014), and ability (Francis et al. 2013; Koester et al. 2014) have all been 
shown to be related to different firm tax strategies. Thus, there is a growing literature 
suggesting that executive’s idiosyncratic differences are related to firm tax strategy.  
However, the evidence is still limited and at times mixed, suggesting a need for further 
study.  
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2.2 The Executive Labor Market 
 The executive labor market differs from a more general labor market for several 
reasons and accordingly has become an area of interest to researchers (Rajgopal et al. 
2012).  First, the compensation of executives is much higher than that of most 
individuals.  Because firms commit so many resources to such a small group of 
executives, the selection of executives is relatively riskier and more important to the 
future performance of the firms they work for (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Zhang and 
Rajagopalan 2004).  Second, executives are hired, fired, and compensated by the board 
of directors but do not directly work for the board of directors but for the shareholders.  
This leads to agency problems not found in other settings (Jensen and Meckling 1976).   
Prior executive labor market research in management, accounting and finance 
has provided insights into how the labor market values executives and what executive 
characteristics may lead to positive or negative labor market consequences.  For 
example, executive pay increases with both accounting earnings (Sloan 1993) and firm 
size (Tosi et al. 2000).  The probability of being promoted to CEO increases when 
executives are overconfident (Goel and Thakor 2008), have large social networks (Liu 
2008), and have international experience (Magnusson and Boggs 2006).   However, prior 
research examining labor market consequences of various executive characteristics does 
not consider executive influence on firm tax strategy. 
2.3 Consequences of Firm Tax Strategy 
 There is a small but growing literature examining the consequences of different 
firm tax strategies, which may give insights into how the labor market could respond to 
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executive influence on firm tax strategy.  If a firm tax strategy increases (decreases) firm 
value then the labor market should reward (punish) executives who encourage that firm 
tax strategy.  However studies document mixed consequences for firms seeking 
particular tax strategies.  For instance, Desai and Dharmapala (2009) demonstrate that 
for well governed firms, firm value is increased by increased levels of firm tax 
avoidance.  Graham and Tucker (2006) demonstrate that firms involved in tax shelters 
lower their leverage levels because of the decreased tax benefit of interest expense.  
Wilson (2009) demonstrates that well governed firms in tax shelters have higher market 
returns than firms without tax shelters.  On the other hand, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) 
find a negative stock market reaction to news that a firm is involved in a tax shelter.  
And Kim et al. (2011) show that high levels of tax avoidance can increase stock price 
crash risk.  Part of the reason for these mixed results could be a tradeoff between the 
level and consistency of firm outcomes.  McGuire et al. (2013) demonstrate that firms 
with consistent tax outcomes have more persistent earnings and cash flows; however, 
those more consistent outcomes often come at a cost of higher levels of tax payments.   
Gallemore et al. (2014) examine the firm reputational consequences of being 
implicated in a tax shelter and conclude that there are no reputational consequences to 
firms engaging in tax shelter activities.  The test in Gallemore et al. (2014) most related 
to my study is the examination of CEO and CFO turnover after a firm is implicated in a 
tax shelter.  They show that at firms implicated in a tax shelter the CEO and CFO 
turnover is no different than at matched non-tax shelter firms for up to three years.  This 
finding could suggest that there are no labor market consequences for executives who 
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influence firm tax strategy.  However, Gallemore et al. (2014) only examine executive 
turnover, which can be limited by executive contracts that dictate the length of 
employment, appropriate causes for termination, and additional termination 
compensation.  On the other hand, I examine labor market consequences that are not tied 
to current contracts and therefore may be sensitive to executive influence on firm tax 
strategy.6   
 Because prior research regarding the consequences of firm tax strategy does not 
indicate that any particular tax strategy consistently leads to more positive firm 
outcomes than any other tax strategy, I explore alternative concepts to inform my 
hypotheses: core activity focus, agency theory, and executive uncertainty.  Given that 
firms and individuals are resistant to change, business strategies tend to be unvarying 
without intervention (Schwartz and Davis 1981; Aladwani 2001).  Therefore, executives 
who have a consistent and unusual influence on firm tax strategy must be focusing on 
taxes to some degree, which could be a signal to the labor market. 
2.4 Core Activity Focus 
 Dyreng et al. (2010) find that executives who are influencing the level of a firm’s 
tax strategy are not influencing leverage, research and development, advertising, cash 
holdings, or foreign operations.  Given that leverage, research and development, 
advertising, cash holdings, and foreign operations are related to core activities at most 
                                                          
6 As discussed in section V, using Gallemore et al.’s (2014) sample and labor market consequences not 
tied to contracts, I find evidence of labor market consequences for executives at firms implicated in tax 
shelters. 
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firms, executive influence on firm tax strategy may be a signal that the executive is 
focused on a non-core activity of the firm.  If an activity is not considered core to the 
success of the firm, then it may better to outsource that activity and allow executives to 
give it little to no attention (Quinn 1999; Contractor et al. 2010).  A retail firms’ core 
activities would be related to selling products, obtaining new products to sell, and 
placing products into new markets.  These activities would be considered core activities 
because they are vital to the survival of the firm.  If any of these activities are not done 
well, the firm may cease to exist.7  Comparatively, firm tax strategy supports the core 
activities of a firm and may enhance value (Mills et al. 1998) but is not likely to 
determine the future survival of a firm. 
 Anecdotally, firms consider core activity focus in hiring and firing executives.  
Recently, JC Penney and Siemens fired their CEOs and cited lack of focus on the core 
activities of the firm as one reason for the removals (cnbc.com 2013; Tuttle 2013).8  
Siemens and Navistar both cited a return to core activities of the firm in their selection of 
new CEOs (Ananthalakshmi 2013; Sheahan 2013).  This issue also arises in the debate 
regarding the level of executive pay (Rapoport 2014; Usvyatsky 2014).  Many executive 
compensation experts argue that executives should not be compensated on overall firm 
                                                          
7 Prior research has shown that mergers and acquisitions lower future firm performance and stockholder 
returns of the acquirer (Haleblian et al. 2009; Ravenscraft and Schere 1988).  One reason for this outcome 
could be that through acquisitions, firms are not focusing on their core activities (Ravenscraft and Schere 
1988; Marks et al. 2001).  If long-term firm performance can be harmed by not focusing on core activities, 
then any signs that executives are not focusing long-term should be noted and considered to prevent the 
firm from focusing on non-core activities. 
 
8 Examining the GAAP ETRs of JC Penney and Siemens suggests that the fired CEOs may have also 
influenced their firm’s tax strategy.  JC Penney had much lower GAAP ETRs during Ron Johnson’s CEO 
tenure.  While the variation of Siemens’ GAAP ETRs increased drastically during Peter Loscher’s CEO 
tenure. 
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performance but on the performance of the core activities of the firm (Dechow et al. 
1994).  Focusing on the core activities of the firm can lead executives to focus long term 
and create the most value for shareholders (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Bhattacharya et 
al. 2003).  Accordingly, many firms prominently report ‘core earnings’ and compensate 
executives based upon ‘core earnings’ (McVay 2006; Rapoport 2014).   
If non-core activities do not lead to firms’ long-term success, executives should 
devote the majority of their time and efforts to core activities of the firm and minimize 
focus on non-core activities like firm tax strategy.  Executives can influence firm tax 
strategy through setting budgets, hiring or firing tax experts, and compensating 
managers.9  While these activities may not take much executive effort or firm resources, 
if an executive is consistently encouraging a specific tax strategy regardless of firm 
characteristics that is a signal that they are focused on a non-core activity and that firm 
core activity performance could suffer in the future.  Therefore executives who influence 
firm tax strategy should face negative labor market consequences.  
2.5 Maximization of Return 
 Agency theory focuses on ways to encourage executives, as agents of 
shareholders’ investments, to maximize the return to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Fama and Jensen 1983).  Because executives have incentives and utility functions 
                                                          
9 I argue that this theory would apply to CFOs as well as to other executives.  Though the CFO is closer to 
the tax department than other executives, taxes are rarely part of their job description.  Rather, according 
to EY (2010) CFOs are to communicate with the external market place, ensure business decisions are 
based on sound financial criteria, provide insights and analysis to support the CEO and other senior 
managers, lead key initiatives in finance to support the overall goals of the firm, obtain funding to enable 
and executive strategy, and help develop and define the overall firm strategy.  Therefore, if a CFO is 
consistently implementing a specific tax strategy regardless of firm characteristics and circumstances, then 
the CFO is allocating their attention to a non-core activity of the firm. 
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which may not align with the shareholders of the firm, much effort and thought has been 
given to induce executives to focus on the returns to shareholders (Lambert 2001).  
Accordingly, executives should use legitimate tools and strategies available to them to 
increase the return to shareholders.  And executives that increase returns to shareholders 
should be rewarded by the executive labor market (Fama 1980). 
Prior research has found results consistent with this expectation.  For instance, 
Fee and Hadlock (2003) demonstrate that executives who become CEOs at a new firm 
come from firms that on average exhibit superior stock performance.  Also executive 
compensation increases with firm performance (Tosi et al. 2000), accounting based 
earnings (Lambert and Larcker 1987), and positive executive influence on return on 
assets (Bertrand and Schoar 2003).  Further, poor firm performance has been shown to 
lead to executive termination (DeFond & Hung 2004; Finkelstein et al. 2009). 
Research has suggested that the better definition of executive ability is the 
capacity to consider more possibilities or solutions rather than the capacity to select the 
best solution from a fixed set (Hambrick and Finkelstein 1987).  Therefore, executive 
influence on firm tax strategy may signal the ability to ‘think outside the box’ and 
consider more possibilities to maximize return to shareholders.  Executives who 
influence firm tax strategy could be adjusting tax investments and outcomes in such a 
way to increase the return to shareholders using all tools at their disposal.  To the extent 
that the labor market recognizes and values efforts to maximize shareholder return using 
all available resources there should be a positive relationship between executive 
influence on firm tax strategy and labor market consequences.   
15 
 
Because prior research suggests that executive influence on firm tax strategy 
could lead to both positive and negative labor market consequences, I state my first 
hypothesis in the null: 
H1: Executives who influence firm tax strategy will have the same labor market 
consequences as executives who do not influence firm tax strategy. 
2.6 Executive Uncertainty 
Although I suggest above that the labor market will notice and respond either 
positively or negatively to executive influence on firm tax strategy, it is possible that the 
labor market may not notice or value executive influence on firm tax strategy.  Most 
accounting research has been based on the neo-classical economic view of executives.  
The theory suggests that executives are rational and will respond to the incentives he or 
she is given to maximize his or her pay (Weintraub 2002).  It could be the case that 
executive influence on firm tax strategy is driven by the incentives provided them (Rego 
and Wilson 2012; Armstrong et al. 2014) and does not represent idiosyncratic executive 
characteristics; therefore, it should not be considered by the executive labor market.  
Also, as boards of directors consider possible executive candidates, influence on firm tax 
strategy may not be considered.  Leadership style, personality, personal connections, and 
ability are likely to drive labor market decisions (Useem 1984; Judge et al. 1995; Seibert 
et al. 2001; Finkelstein et al. 2009). 
If leadership style, personality, and ability are driving labor market decisions, in 
what situations would executive influence on firm tax strategy be considered?  Signaling 
theory discusses how in situations of information asymmetry, the party with more 
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information, the signaler, can send a signal containing private information to the party 
with less information, the receiver (Spence 1973, 1974; Connelly et al. 2011).  In the 
executive labor market, executives have been shown to unintentionally send positive and 
negative signals to boards of directors (Perkins and Hendry 2005).  If I consider 
executive influence on firm tax strategy a weak signal of executive characteristics, then 
the signal may not be received unless the receiver is actively looking for additional 
signals (Gulati and Higgins 2003; Ilmola and Kuusi 2006).  And receivers should 
actively search for additional signals when they are facing uncertainty (Kohn and 
Shavell 1974; Reilly and Conover 1983).  Accordingly, when uncertain about the 
performance and characteristics of an executive, boards of directors will seek out 
additional information about that executive and will be more likely to consider executive 
influence on firm tax strategy.10 
H2: The relation between labor market consequences and executive influence on 
firm tax strategy is stronger among executives with uncertain performance and 
characteristics. 
  
                                                          
10 Executive influence on firm tax strategy could signal multiple things to the labor market about an 
executive’s personality, leadership style, or ability.  If executives are influencing firm tax strategy because 
they are focused on non-core activities, this could signal that the executive is obsessive, distracted, a 
micromanager, or a poor performer who covers it up by focusing on non-core activities.  If executives are 
influencing firm tax strategy to maximize return to shareholders, this could signal to the labor market that 
the executive is creative or has the ability to manage many things at the same time. 
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3. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Measuring Executive Influence on Firm Tax Strategy 
 To measure executive influence on firm tax strategy, I obtain an initial sample of 
41,605 executives from Execucomp from 1992 to 2013.  I retain executives who work 
for more than one firm for at least three years, leaving 1,919 executives in the sample.  
Requiring executives to work for at least three years at multiple companies allows me to 
measure the executive influence on firm tax strategy separate from the firms’ influence 
on firm tax strategy (Bertrand and Schoar 2003), which is essential to the inferences of 
my study.  Also, executives are allowed sufficient time to demonstrate a consistent 
influence on firm tax strategy.  I include all firm years from Compustat for all firms 
associated with these 1,919 executives that have required regression variables.  This 
creates a sample of 31,918 executive-firm-years with which I estimate Equation (1) 
following Dyreng et al. (2010): 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼2𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑖 + 𝛼4𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                 
(1) 
Where ETR is GAAP ETR, GETR, or the coefficient of variation of GAAP ETR, 
CVGETR.  I choose these firm tax strategy proxies for two reasons.  First, recent 
research has suggested that firm tax strategy activities have two basic dimensions: level 
and variation (McGuire et al. 2013; Neuman 2014).  Because I want to identify 
executives influencing either dimension of firm tax strategy, I include variables that 
capture both the level and the variation of firm tax strategies.  Second, both of these 
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measures are based on GAAP ETR which ties to tax expense in the financial statements, 
are explicitly reported and discussed in the notes to the financial statements, and are 
often stated in earnings announcements.  Accordingly, decision makers in the executive 
labor market can easily observe GAAP ETRs and estimate an executive influence on a 
firm’s GAAP ETR.  Also prior research has shown that executives focus on GAAP 
ETRs over CASH ETRs (Armstrong et al. 2012; Graham et al. 2014; Robinson et al. 
2010), suggesting that the executive labor market would also focus on GAAP ETRs.11   
GETR is calculated as total income tax expense divided by pretax book income 
less special items (Dyreng et al. 2010).  CVGETR is calculated over a three year period12 
from year t-2 to year t and is the standard deviation of the ratio of total income tax 
expense divided by pretax book income all divided by the mean of the same ratio, total 
income tax expense divided by pretax book income (McGuire et al. 2013).13     
CONTROL is an array of time-variant firm characteristics consisting of Leverage, 
OptionExpense, R&D, NOL, Size, Foreign, Advertising, Capex, Intangible, PPE, and 
SGA (Dyreng et al. 2010).  Leverage proxies for the tax advantage of debt (Mills et al. 
                                                          
11 I acknowledge that GAAP ETR measures do not capture tax strategies associated with deferral items as 
Cash ETR measures do.  However, in untabulated analysis, I find that executives who influence the Cash 
ETR or the coefficient of variation of Cash ETR do not have different labor market consequences than 
executives who do not influence Cash ETR or the coefficient of variation of Cash ETR.  This is consistent 
with boards of directors and other decision makers in the labor market focusing on GAAP ETR measures. 
 
12 Prior research estimating the variation of tax strategies has based their measure on a five year period 
from year t-4 to year t (McGuire et al. 2013).  I use a three year period because I only require executives to 
spend three years at a firm.  A five year measure could be outside the bounds of their employment.  Even a 
three year measure has values early in an executive’s tenure that are related to the prior executive, creating 
some noise in my measure. 
 
13 While McGuire et al. (2013) focus on the coefficient of variation of Cash ETR, they note that their 
results are consistent using the coefficient of variation of GAAP ETR. 
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1998).  R&D controls for the tax credit associated with research and development 
(Berger 1993).  Firms with tax loss carryforwards on their books, NOL, can shelter 
future income against tax (Maydew 1997).  Size and Foreign are included because larger 
firms and firms with foreign operations have more tax planning opportunities and tend to 
have lower ETRs (Gupta and Newberry 1997; Rego 2003).  Advertising, Capex, 
Intangible, PPE, SGA, and OptionExpense give information about the flexibility and 
structure of the firm which influence firm tax strategy (Mills et al. 1998; Dyreng et al. 
2010).  All variables in CONTROL are calculated following Dyreng et al. (2010) and 
detailed in Appendix A. 
 YEAR, FIRM, and EXEC are arrays of year, firm, and executive fixed effects.  
EXEC is the variable measuring executive influence on firm tax strategy (Dyreng et al. 
2010).14  From the estimates of EXEC, I create my measures of executive influence on 
firm tax strategy, ExecInfluence, which is defined as SigGETR or SigCVGETR.  
SigGETR (SigCVGETR) is an indicator variable equal to one for any executive with a 
coefficient on EXEC that is statistically significant (p-value < 0.05)15 when estimating 
Equation (1) with GETR (CVGETR) as my dependent variable.16   
                                                          
14 My base group for the executive fixed effects (Woolridge 2009) is all firm years in my sample without 
an identified executive.  This makes my estimates of EXEC roughly the difference between a particular 
executive’s influence on firm tax strategy and the average executive’s influence on firm tax strategy. 
 
15 In untabulated analysis, the sign and significance of my main results (Table 3 and Columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 4) remain the same if I use a cut off of p-value < 0.10.  Though slightly weaker, the inferences of 
my main results also remain the same using a cut off of p-value < 0.01. 
 
16 I use a statistical method to estimate an executive’s influence on firm tax strategy, whereas boards of 
directors examining executives will not likely have such estimates.  However, they will only examine a 
few executives at a time, allowing them to consider firm structure, changes in overall firm strategy, and 
incentives to appropriately determine if an executive is encouraging a particular tax strategy.  Therefore, 
my statistical estimates are a reasonable proxy for the actual process boards of directors may go through. 
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 The executive fixed effect methodology has faced recent criticism (see Fee et al. 
2013), but I use it because evidence suggests that the coefficient estimates from this 
method capture idiosyncratic executive characteristics (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; 
Bamber et al. 2010; Dyreng et al. 2010).  Fee et al. (2013) examine changes in firm 
characteristics around exogenous and endogenous CEO changes.  They find evidence 
consistent with boards of directors hiring executives who fit the goals the firm wants to 
pursue.  As part of this analysis, Fee et al. (2013) use a simulation technique to 
demonstrate that an F-test on a group of executive fixed effects is not necessarily 
consistent with those executives as a whole significantly influencing a particular firm’s 
outcome.  However, Fee et al. (2013) does not provide evidence that the individual 
coefficient estimates of the fixed effects are not meaningful.  Bertrand and Schoar 
(2003) and Bamber et al. (2010) demonstrate that the estimated coefficients for the 
executive fixed effects in their studies are related to other executive characteristics, 
suggesting that the fixed effects do measure a real executive characteristic.  Also, 
Dyreng et al. (2010) run a similar simulation to Fee et al. (2013) and show that in none 
of their 1,000 simulations of random data is the number of significant executive fixed 
effect coefficients as high as the number of significant executive fixed effect coefficients 
in their actual data.  So while Fee et al. (2013) demonstrate that an F-test is not 
appropriate to conclude executive influence on a firm’s outcome, prior research has 
demonstrated that the individual fixed effect coefficients are meaningful and related to 
idiosyncratic executive characteristics.  Accordingly, they are useful to estimate 
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executive influence on firm tax strategy.17  Further, this executive fixed effect 
methodology allows me to separate the executive’s influence on firm tax strategy from 
any changes in tax strategy due to changes in the firm characteristics and opportunities.  
Thus it cleanly measures the unusual influence an executive has on firm tax strategy. 
3.2 Sample Selection 
 After estimating Equation (1), I have 1,787 executives for whom I am able to 
estimate ExecInfluence.  I remove 121 executives who work at two concurrent jobs 
(beginning and end dates of one job are within the beginning and end dates of the other 
job) rather than a job change.  I also remove 111 executives who work for three or more 
firms because it is not clear which job move should be used to measure labor market 
consequences (first or last or average).18   Finally, I remove 159 executives who do not 
have all the required regression variables from Compustat, Execucomp, and BoardEx, 
leaving me with a sample of 1,396 executives.  See Table 1 in Appendix B for an 
overview of my sample selection process. 
                                                          
17 To verify that my results are due to an executive characteristic and not firm characteristics, in 
untabulated analysis I run a number of robustness tests.  First, I regress the percent of executives who 
significantly influence firm tax strategy at each firm in my sample on the average firm values of 
CONTROL from Equation (1) as well as ROA and executive stock, option, and bonus incentives.  
Including the variables that significantly (p < 0.10) influence either GETR or CVGETR, NOL, ROA, 
Intangible, and PPE, as additional controls to Equation (2) has no effect to the sign or significance of my 
main results (Table 3 and Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4).  Second, I re-estimate Equation (2) but base 
ExecInfluence on the firm fixed effects from Equation (1) for the first firm the executive worked for 
instead of the executive fixed effects.  In the full sample, the coefficients are not significant (both p-values 
> 0.10).  Third, I find that the mean GETR and CVGETR the year before an executive who significantly 
influences GETR or CVGETR joins a firm are not significantly different than the mean GETR and 
CVGETR in all of Compustat.  Fourth, I include executives’ incentives (delta and vega) in Equation (1) 
and re-estimate ExecInfluence.  These incentives have no impact on the sign or significance of my main 
results (Table 3 and Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4). 
 
18 In untabulated analysis, I retain executives who work for three or more firms and use their last job 
change to measure labor market consequences.  The sign and significance of my main results (Table 3 and 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4) remain the same. 
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These 1,396 executives consist of 471 executives who influence either the level 
or variation dimension of tax strategy (184 influence the level and 361 influence the 
variation with 74 influencing both) and 925 executives who do not influence either 
dimension of firm tax strategy.  Executives who do not influence firm tax strategy are 
retained so that my tests can compare executives who influence firm tax strategy against 
those who do not.  Also, consistent with Dyreng et al. (2010) I do not restrict my sample 
of executives based upon title.  All the executives in my sample are among the top five 
paid executives at both firms they work for, and 74.1 percent are either a CEO or CFO at 
one of their jobs.19, 20  If I keep only CEOs and CFOs, I could add bias to my results by 
removing executives who are never promoted to CEO or CFO and only keeping 
executives with positive labor market consequences.  
3.3 Measuring Executive Labor Market Consequences 
 I define labor market consequences as changes in the opportunities executives 
have in the labor market as a result of their actions.  I use promotion as my proxy for 
labor market consequences because promotion captures improvements in both financial21 
and non-financial opportunities.  Also promotion is not directly related to particular tax 
                                                          
19 Of the 25.9 percent of executives who are never CEOs or CFOs, 97.0 percent (25.1 percent of the full 
sample) are general counsel, chief operating officers, vice presidents, or presidents.  All of these groups 
could reasonably influence tax strategy within the bounds of their job description (Dyreng et al. 2010). 
 
20In untabulated analysis, I rerun my main results (Table 3 and Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4) restricting my 
sample to executives who are ever a CEO, ever a CFO, or both.  In all cases, my inferences remain the 
same. 
 
21 For instance, from 1992 to 2013 the median CEO in Execucomp received $2.2 million in total 
compensation (Execucomp’s TDC1), while the median non-CEO received $0.9 million.  Further, from 
1992 to 2013 CEOs at firms with above median total assets had a median total compensation of $3.9 
million compared to just $1.3 million for CEOs at firms with below median total assets. 
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strategies as executive bonuses and equity holdings can be (Rego and Wilson 2009).  
Finally, promotion occurs in the liquid labor market while compensation is tied to 
contracts and cannot respond freely to executive influence on firm tax strategy. 
Most prior research examining executive promotion has examined internal 
promotions to CEO (Kim 2002; Magnusson and Boggs 2006; Liu 2008).  However, my 
sample contains executives who started as CEOs and executives whose promotions 
occur by moving firms, making internal promotion to CEO an inappropriate measure of 
promotion in this study.  Therefore, I create a measure of promotion consistent with 
prior research but appropriate for my setting.  I construct an indicator variable, Promote, 
equal to one when an executive is promoted.22  I consider an executive to be promoted in 
two situations.  First, an executive is promoted if the executive was not a CEO at their 
first job but is at their second job.  Because these executives have moved firms, I also 
require the executive promoted to CEO to have moved to a firm with a market value of 
equity, MVE, no smaller than half that of the first firm.  Second, I consider an executive 
to be promoted if the executive kept the same level of position (CEO or non-CEO) but 
moved to a larger firm identified as having a MVE twice that of the first firm.23   
 
                                                          
22 In my sample, the median promoted executive’s total compensation (Execucomp’s TDC1) over the first 
three years at their second job increase 92.8 percent compared to the last three years at their first job.  
While demoted executives (see Appendix A for demotion definition) experience a 4.0 percent increase, 
and other executive experience a 59.0 percent increase. 
 
23 In untabulated analysis, I change the MVE cutoff for calculating Promote for becoming CEO to one-
fourth and to one instead of one-half and the cutoff for staying the same title to four and to one instead of 
two.  In all cases, the sign and significance of my main results (Table 3 and Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4) 
remain the same. 
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3.4 Research Design – Hypothesis 1 
 To determine the executive labor market consequences of executive influence on 
firm tax strategy, I estimate the following logistic equation: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑚𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑚𝑡 + 𝜇𝑚𝑡                        (2) 
Promote is as defined above.  ExecInfluence is either SigGETR or SigCVGETR and is 
my variable of interest.  A significant estimate of β1 would cause me to reject H1 and 
conclude that executive influence on firm tax strategy has an impact in the executive 
labor market.24 
 ExecCharacteristics is an array of executive characteristics, which prior research 
suggest affect the value of the executive in the labor market.  It consists of Connections, 
Young, Old, Gender, Tenure, Masters, Doctorate, Association, Elite, Background, 
PriorCEO, and InternationalExp.  All time variant executive characteristics are 
measured during the last year of the executive’s first job, unless otherwise noted, as this 
represents the value of the variable when the executive labor market was evaluating the 
executive.  Connections is the number of public boards the executive has been on over 
their career according to BoardEx in 201425 and represents the number of connections 
                                                          
24 In untabulated analysis I estimate Equation (2) clustering standard errors on the year of job change and 
industry the executive came from, and the sign and significance of my main results (Table 3 and Columns 
1 and 2 of Table 4) remain the same.  Further, I also estimate Equation (2) including year and industry 
fixed effects.  Again, the sign and significance of my main results remain the same. 
 
25 This data is not available for all years in my sample.  Accordingly, I cannot match this to the number of 
boards the executive had been on when the labor market was examining them.  However, as these numbers 
are very sticky and I want a consistent measurement, I measure this variable in 2014 for all executives.  In 
untabulated analysis, I find that my results are inferentially the same if I use the earliest data available 
(usually 2002) instead of 2014. 
25 
 
that an executive has as this can improve labor market outcomes (Kim 2002; Liu 2008).  
Young and Old are indicator variables representing the first and third terciles of the age 
of the executive (first tercile: 26 - 46; second tercile: 47 - 51; third tercile: 52 - 89) as 
prior research has documented a nonlinear relationship between age and labor market 
consequences (Magnusson and Boggs 2006).  Gender controls for any gender 
discrimination and equals one if the executive is female (Bertrand and Hallock 2001).  
Tenure is the number of years the executive worked at the first firm as prior research 
suggests it increases the probability of promotion (Magnusson and Boggs 2006).  
Masters (Doctorate) is an indicator variable equal to one if the executive has a masters 
or professional (doctorate) degree because prior research has shown that increases in an 
executives’ level of education can increase the likelihood of future promotions 
(Magnusson and Boggs 2006).  Association is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
executive has been a member of a professional association and is an sign of social and 
business connections, which improve labor market consequences (Kim 2002).  Elite is 
an indicator if the executive attended an elite educational institution as this creates an 
information and social network among alumni (Useem and Karabel 1986; Kim 2002).26  
Background is an indicator equal to one if the executive has a background in finance or 
accounting.  Prior research has suggested that executives with specific functional 
backgrounds may be more likely to be promoted than others (Magnusson and Boggs 
2006).  PriorCEO is an indicator if the executive was CEO at their first job as this 
                                                          
26 I measure elite education institutions based upon the rankings of US News and World Reports in 2002, 
the middle of my sample period.  See Appendix A for a list of schools considered Elite. 
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reduces the upward mobility of the executive in the labor market.  InternationalExp is 
the natural log of the average international income the executive’s first firm had over the 
last three years the executive was at the firm and has been shown to lead to promotions 
(Magnusson and Boggs 2006).   
FirmCharacteristics is an array of firm characteristics included as control 
variables: ROA, MarketSize, and FirmAge and represents values from the first firm at 
which the executive worked.27  ROA controls for firm performance as executives 
working at high performing firms are more likely to be promoted (Kim 2002; Fee and 
Hadlock 2003).  ROA is the average return on assets over the last three years the 
executive was at their first firm, where return on assets is net income divided by lagged 
total assets.28, 29  MarketSize and FirmAge could lead to executives gaining specialized 
skills, which could affect their prospects of promotion.  MarketSize is the natural log of 
MVE.  FirmAge is the number of years the firm has been listed in Compustat.  All 
                                                          
27 It is possible that since these executives are changing the firm’s tax strategy, this creates some 
uncertainty to investors.  To verify that my results are due to executive influence on firm tax strategy and 
not uncertainty, in untabulated analysis I include the variation of the firm’s stock during the last three 
years the executive was at the firm or the executives influence on firm stock variation.  In both cases the 
sign and significance of my main results (Table 3 and Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4) remain the same. 
 
28 Prior research has shown that executives can have a unique influence on firm performance (Bertrand 
and Schoar 2003).  To verify my results are not driven by executives’ influence on firm performance, in 
untabulated analysis I re-estimate Equation (1) using return on assets as the dependent variable.  I then 
take the executive fixed effects from the return on assets estimation and add them as an additional control 
variable to Equation (2).  Doing so has no impact on the sign or significance of my main results (Table 3 
and Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4). 
 
29 I choose to use an after tax return on assets, ROA, to show that the response to executive influence on 
firm tax strategy is independent of how those tax strategies may impact after tax firm performance.  
However, ROA could be associated with a firm’s tax strategy.  In untabulated analysis, I replace ROA with 
firm performance measures based upon pretax income, core earnings (operating income before 
depreciation), or percent change in MVE.  In all cases the sign and significance of my main results (Table 
3 and Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4) remain the same.   
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continuous variables in Equation (2) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile unless 
otherwise noted.  Additional details about variable calculations can be found in 
Appendix A. 
3.5 Research Design – Hypothesis 2 
 My second hypothesis suggests that the relation between executive influence on 
firm tax strategy and labor market consequences should be stronger when the labor 
market is uncertain about an executive.  Uncertainty about an executive could arise when 
the labor market is uncertain about the characteristics of the executives.  If the executive 
is not well known in the labor market, then uncertainty will abound about their 
personality and leadership style, characteristics crucial to executive success (Kirkpatrick 
and Locke 1990; Peterson et al. 2009).   
To capture uncertainty regarding an executive, I calculate Uncertain as an 
indicator variable equal to one if the executive does not sit on any public boards during 
their careers according to BoardEx (Connections equals zero).30 Once I have created 
Uncertain, I split my sample into those executives who have high uncertainty and those 
who do not and re-estimate Equation (2).  H2 suggests that I should find stronger effects 
for those executives with high uncertainty. 
  
                                                          
30 In untabulated additional analysis, I use firm idiosyncratic risk (Bushman et al. 2010) to create 
Uncertain instead of board seats.  The inferences of my results do not hold in this situation.  This is not 
surprising given that this measure is focused on firm uncertainty and not executive uncertainty.  
Alternatively, in untabulated analysis, I use a broad measure of executive connections from BoardEx 
combined with poor firm performance to measure uncertainty about an executive.  While not as well 
grounded in theory, this measure does a better job of splitting my sample by uncertainty (the differences 
between coefficients in uncertainty and not uncertainty are statistically significant). 
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4. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
 I present all tables referenced in the manuscript in Appendix B.  Summary 
statistics for the sample used to estimate Equation (1) following Dyreng et al. (2010) can 
be found in Table 2 Panel A.  My sample is larger than Dyreng et al.’s (2010) because 
my time period extends to 2013 compared to 2006.  Overall, the summary statistics are 
consistent with Dyreng et al. (2010).  Given that the recent financial crisis led to taxable 
losses, I find a larger percent of firms having an NOL.  The financial crisis could also 
explain why I find a slightly lower level of CAPEX compared to Dyreng et al. (2010).   
Summary statistics for the sample of executives used to estimate Equation (2) are 
found in Table 2 Panel B.  In my sample, 43.6 percent of job changes are classified as 
promotions.  I find that 13.2 percent and 25.9 percent of executives significantly 
influence GETR and CVGETR, respectively.31  The mean Connections in my sample is 
1.7 and 5.5 percent of my sample is female.  Also, 37.9 percent of executives in my 
sample have finance or accounting backgrounds and 19.8 percent were CEOs at their 
first job.  The companies at which these executives work have an average MarketSize of 
7.68 (natural log of MVE), an average ROA of 3.5 percent, and an average FirmAge of 
28.4 years. 
                                                          
31 I find that 16.5 (24.9) percent of CEOs, 11.5 (28.6) percent of CFOs, and 10.9 (24.7) percent of other 
executives influence GETR (CVGETR), suggesting that CEOs and CFOs are more likely than other 
executives to influence firm tax strategy consistent with the idea that executives influence firm tax strategy 
through ‘tone at the top.’ 
29 
 
 In Table 2 Panel C, I divide my sample into the 184 executives who influence 
GETR (SigGETR = 1), the 287 executives who influence CVGETR (SigCVGETR = 1), 
and the 925 executives who do not influence either measure of tax strategy.  I find that 
those who influence CVGETR are less likely to be promoted compared to those who do 
not influence firm tax strategy, providing some univariate evidence consistent with 
executives who influence firm tax strategy facing negative labor market consequences.  I 
also note that the firms associated with executives who influence firm tax strategy on 
average perform worse than other firms, which would be expected if these executives are 
focusing on non-core activities of the firm.32  I find that executives who influence firm 
tax strategy are likely to have more connections, less likely to be female, more likely to 
have gone to an elite school, and work at slightly smaller firms.  Connections is the only 
variable with a significant difference between executives who influence GETR and those 
who influence CVGETR.33 
4.2 Hypothesis 1 
 Table 3 provides my estimates of Equation (2), regressing Promote on 
ExecInfluence and controls.  When SigGETR is my variable of interest (Column 1), I 
find an insignificant coefficient (-0.0869, p-value > 0.10), suggesting that the labor 
market either does not recognize or does not value executive influence on the level 
                                                          
32 The differences in ROA are stronger when looking at a return on assets based on core earnings 
(operating income before depreciation) of the firm suggesting that the differences in ROA are at least 
partially driven by poorer performance in core activities. 
 
33 I note that 74 executives influence both SigGETR and SigCVGETR, which will minimize any 
differences between the two groups.  However, if I remove those 74 executives and re-estimate the 
differences in means, only one more variable, InternationalExp, is significantly different (p-value < 0.10) 
with those who influence GETR having more international experience than those who influence CVGETR. 
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dimension of firm tax strategy.  Model fit is adequate with the area under the ROC curve 
of 0.709 (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2002).  Also, the p-value of the Pearson goodness-of-
fit test is 0.139, meaning I cannot reject the null that the fit of the model is adequate.  
When SigCVGETR is my variable of interest (Column 2), I find a negative and 
significant coefficient (-0.4692, p-value < 0.01).34  This suggests that the executives who 
influence the variation dimension of firm tax strategy are less likely to be promoted than 
those who do not influence the variation dimension of firm tax strategy.  Fit of this 
model is also adequate: area under the ROC curve is 0.715 and the Pearson goodness-of-
fit p-value is 0.145.  Consistent with prior research, I find that Connections and Young 
are positively related to Promote.  Also, PriorCEO and MarketSize are negatively 
related to Promote as executives who are CEOs or at large firms are close to the apex of 
the labor market and have few opportunities to be promoted.  However, most of my 
control variables are not significant predictors of executive promotion.  This is consistent 
with non-measurable variables of personality, leadership style, and ability driving the 
promotion decision (Finkelstein et al. 2009).  
 Overall, the results in Table 3 provide some evidence that executives who 
influence firm tax strategy face negative labor market consequences.  This is consistent 
with executives who influence firm tax strategy focusing on non-core activities of the 
firm.  This result is found only among executives who influence the variation dimension 
of firm tax strategy.  Research suggests that investors and executives prefer smooth 
                                                          
34 The odds ratio for this coefficient suggest that executives who influence the variation of firm tax 
strategy are 37 percent less likely to be promoted than other executives. 
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earnings over temporarily high earnings (DeFond and Park 1997; Goel and Thakor 
2003).  Therefore, the executive labor market may be more sensitive to executive 
influence on firm tax strategy that could affect the variation of earnings compared to 
executive influence on firm tax strategy that could affect the level of earnings. 
4.3 Hypothesis 2 
 My second hypothesis suggests that executive influence on firm tax strategy will 
impact labor market consequences the most when there is uncertainty regarding the 
executive’s characteristics and performance.  Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 provide 
estimates of Equation (2) among executives where Uncertain is equal to one.  When 
SigGETR is my variable of interest (Column 1), the coefficient is insignificant (-0.2483, 
p-value > 0.10).  When SigCVGETR is my variable of interest (Column2), the coefficient 
is negative and significant (-0.7771, p-value < 0.01).35  These results are consistent with 
the results in Table 3, but slightly stronger.   
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 provide estiamtes of Equation (2) among executives 
where Uncertain is equal to zero.  When SigGETR is my variable of interest (Column 3), 
the coefficient is insignificant (0.0396, p-value > 0.10).  When SigCVGETR is my 
variable of interest (Column4), the coefficient is negative and marginally significant (-
0.2981, p-value < 0.10).  These results are still consistent with Table 3, but much 
weaker.  Overall, these results suggest that executives who influence the variation of 
                                                          
35 The odds ratios of these statistics suggest that under uncertainty executives who influence the level 
(variation) of firm tax strategy are 22 (54) percent less likely to be promoted than executives who do not 
influence the level (variation) of firm tax strategy. 
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firm tax strategy are less likely to be promoted compared to those who do not influence 
firm tax strategy.36  Also, given the fact that under uncertainty the coefficients are more 
negative gives support for H2.37 
 Overall, my results reject H1 and I conclude that there are negative labor market 
consequences to executive influence on firm tax strategy.38  These negative labor market 
consequences are consistent with executive influence on firm tax strategy being 
perceived as executives focusing on non-core activities of the firm.39, 40  These results 
                                                          
36 In untabulated analysis, I re-estimate Equation (2) using demotion, Demote (see Appendix A for 
variable calculation), as my dependent variable.  Among my full sample, the coefficient on SigCVGETR is 
positive and marginally significant (0.2846, p-value < 0.10). This weakly suggests that executives who 
influence variation of firm tax strategy are also more likely to be demoted.  
 
37 In untabulated analysis, I re-estimate Equation (2) when Uncertain = 1 and when Uncertain = 0 using 
seemingly unrelated estimation, which allows me to test coefficients across models (see Weesie 1999).  
Using both SigGETR and SigCVGETR as my variable of interest, I find that the coefficients are not 
significantly different when Uncertain = 1 compared to when Uncertain = 0 (p-values > 0.10).  This 
suggests that while uncertainty does lead the labor market to more fully consider executive influence on 
firm tax strategy, it does not have a statistically significant influence. 
 
38 Since executives with an accounting or finance background may have more ability and reason to 
influence firm tax strategy, in untabulated analysis I split my high uncertainty sample into executives with 
an accounting or finance background and those without.  I continue to find a negative and significant (p-
value < 0.05) coefficient on SigCVGETR regardless of background and an insignificant (p-value > 0.10) 
coefficient on SigGETR regardless of background. 
 
39 Prior research has suggested that executives could use a very aggressive tax strategy to obfuscate the 
firm’s activities and divert funds for their own benefit (Desai and Dharmapala 2006).  This could also lead 
to negative labor market consequences.  However, Dyreng et al. (2010) show that executives who 
influence firm tax strategy do not also influence selling, general, and administrative expenses through 
which such diversion of funds would likely flow.  Further, I find that executives who encourage consistent 
tax strategies also face negative labor market consequences; not just executives who encourage aggressive 
or inconsistent tax strategies (see the Direction of Executive Influence on Firm Tax Strategy additional 
analysis in section V). 
 
40 If executives are using tax strategy to manage earnings, this could signal to the labor market that an 
executive is prone to manipulate information which could lead to negative labor market consequences.  
However, an earnings management story is inconsistent with my result that firms with executives who 
influence firm tax strategy have lower ROA than other firms as earnings management should on average 
increase earnings.  Further, in untabulated analysis, I include accruals, discretionary accruals, or executive 
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are not consistent with executive influence on firm tax strategy being perceived as 
executives increasing the return to shareholders using all available tools. 41  I find results 
consistent with H2 suggesting that executive influence on firm tax strategy is additional 
information the labor market uses when there is uncertainty regarding the performance 
and characteristics of the executive.42   
  
                                                          
influence on accruals or discretionary accruals as an additional control in Equation 2.  Doing so has no 
impact on the sign or significance of my main results (Table 3 and Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4). 
 
41 Though I do not find evidence consistent with a maximization of return using all avenues, it is still 
possible that under certain circumstances the labor market could view executives’ influence on firm tax 
strategy positively.  In untabulated analysis, I examine two possible sub-samples where this is more likely: 
well-known executives (Lefkowitz 2000; Bol 2011), and cash strapped firms.  Among these groups, the 
coefficients on SigCVGETR are still negative and significant, suggesting that the labor market is not 
responding to the tax strategy but to executive focus on non-core activities. 
 
42 In untabulated additional analysis, I estimate manager fixed effects on overall firm performance, core 
performance, and non-core performance.  Including this influences as an additional control has no impact 
on the sign or significance of my results.  
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5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Alternative Methodology to Estimate Executive Influence 
 One limitation of my methodology for estimating executive influence on firm tax 
strategy is that it requires executives to work at two firms.  This limitation greatly 
reduces my sample and could limit the generalizability of my results.  Accordingly, I use 
an alternative method that allows me to estimate executive influence on firm tax strategy 
for a much larger sample of executives.  Specifically, I leverage the fact that executives 
who work for multiple firms overlap with executives who only work for one firm, 
allowing me to estimate fixed effects for both groups (see Abowd et al. 1999 and 
Graham et al. 2012 for a complete description of the analysis).  I still require executives 
to be at a firm for at least three years allowing them time to influence firm tax strategy.  
This alternative method allows me to estimate ExecInfluence for 15,703 executives who 
work for a single firm. 
 For the 15,703 executives who work for a single firm, I create two new measures 
of labor market consequences because these executives do not have a firm move to 
analyze.  First, I define Promote2 as an executive starting out as a non-CEO and 
becoming a CEO at the same firm (Magnusson and Boggs 2006).  Second, to consider 
executives pushed out of the labor market, I define ForcedOut as an indicator variable 
equal to one for executives who leave the labor market before age 60 (Brickley 2003; 
Engel et al. 2003).  Prior research has shown that executives who leave the labor market 
after age 60 are, on average, retiring and leaving the labor market voluntarily.  While 
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executives who leave the labor market before age 60 are likely being forced out (Parrino 
1997; Brickley 2003; Engel et al. 2003). 
 I re-estimate Equation (2) using Promote2 or ForcedOut as my dependent 
variable using the sample of executives who only work for one firm.  I restrict the 
sample to executives whose terminal year in the labor market is before 2012.  This 
restriction removes executives who are still currently in the labor market and, 
accordingly, whose labor market consequences are still unknown.  When Promote2 is 
my dependent variable, I restrict my sample to executives who began their tenure at the 
firm as non-CEOs who can be promoted, and I remove PriorCEO as a control variable 
because it is used to create Promote2.  When ForcedOut is my dependent variable I 
remove Age as a control variable as it is used to define ForcedOut.43   
As shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, when SigGETR or SigCVGETR is my 
variable of interest and Promote2 is my dependent variable, the coefficient is negative 
and significant (-0.3695, p-value < 0.01, -0.2119, p-value < 0.05, respectively).  These 
results suggest that executives who influence firm tax strategy are less likely to be 
promoted to CEO.  As shown in Column 3 of Table 5, when SigGETR is my variable of 
interest and ForcedOut is my dependent variable, the coefficient is insignificant (0.1169, 
p-value > 0.10).  As shown in Column 4 of Table 5, when SigCVGETR is my variable of 
interest and ForcedOut is my dependent variable, the coefficient is positive and 
significant (0.1761, p-value < 0.01). These results suggest that executives who influence 
                                                          
43 In addition, I remove Tenure as a control variable when predicting Promote2 or ForcedOut because 
executives who are promoted to CEO or not forced out of the labor market will have longer tenure than 
other executives.  This could lead the dependent variable to determine values of a control variable rather 
than the other way around. 
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firm tax strategy are more likely to be forced out of the labor market.  Overall, the results 
analyzing executives who work for a single firm are consistent with my main results in 
Table 3, suggesting that my results are generalizable to all executives.44 
 In my main analyses, I measure executive influence on firm tax strategy over a 
time period both before and after the labor market consequences are measured.  
Executive influence on firm tax strategy should be a consistent personal characteristic 
like personality, and the time period over which I measure it should not affect my 
results. In this test using executives who work for one firm and ForcedOut as my 
dependent variable, executives’ influence on firm tax strategy is measured exclusively 
before labor market consequences, supporting my argument that the time period over 
which I measure executives’ influence on firm tax strategy does not impact my results. 
5.2 Alternative Non-Core Activity 
 I have suggested that a negative relation between executive influence on firm tax 
strategy and labor market consequences is consistent with the view that these executives 
are focusing on non-core activities of the firm.  To verify that non-core activity focus is 
the reason these executives who influence firm tax strategy have negative labor market 
consequences, I examine the labor market consequences of executives who influence a 
different non-core activity.  While I am not aware of any other archival proxies for non-
core focus, I suggest that the decision to lease or buy an asset when that decision has no 
                                                          
44 In untabulated additional analysis, I examine the impact of Uncertain on executives at only one firm.  
Theoretically, uncertainty should not apply to executives within a firm because the board of directors at 
the firm knows these individuals personally, so their performance and characteristics should always be 
known.  Consistent with this idea, I find that uncertainty does not increase the strength of the relation 
between executive influence on firm tax strategy and promotion. 
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impact on the future cash flows, earnings, or performance of the firm could also indicate 
non-core activity focus.  While there is no research regarding executive influence on the 
decision to lease or buy as there is regarding executive influence on firm tax strategy, the 
decision to lease or buy would be a non-core decision as long as it has no impact on the 
accounting or economics of the transaction.  
 I measure the decision to lease or buy an asset, LeasePercent, as the ratio of total 
liabilities from capitalized leases to total liabilities.  By only looking at capitalized 
leases, I make sure that the underlying economics and reporting of the transaction are the 
same regardless of the decision to buy or lease.  I then re-estimate Equation (1) using 
LeasePercent as the dependent variable and determine which executives significantly 
influence the decision to lease or buy an asset, SigLease.  I find that 11.7 percent of 
executives in my sample significantly (p-value < 0.05) influence the decision to lease or 
buy an asset.  When I re-estimate Equation (2) using SigLease, I find a negative and 
significant coefficient on SigLease (-0.5324, p-value < 0.01).  This suggests that 
executives who influence the decision to lease or buy assets are less likely to be 
promoted than executives who do not influence the decision to lease or buy assets.  This 
provides further evidence consistent with the idea that executives face negative labor 
market consequences for focusing on non-core activities of the firm.45 
 
 
                                                          
45 Further, I note that SigLease and SigCVGETR are positively and significantly correlated (0.0763, p-
value < 0.01), suggesting that they are capturing a similar underlying construct which I argue is non-core 
activity focus. 
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5.3 Gallemore et al. (2014) Sample 
 As part of their analysis, Gallemore et al. (2014) examine the turnover of CEOs 
and CFOs for up to three years after a firm was implicated in a tax shelter.  They find 
that the levels of turnover among firms implicated in a tax shelter were not statistically 
different from a matched set of firms not implicated in a tax shelter.  However, executive 
turnover in the short-term can be limited by executive contracts.  To determine if the 
results of Gallemore et al. (2014) are consistent with my results, I examine the 
executives in the Gallemore et al. (2014) study who did turnover to determine their labor 
market consequences. 
 Gallemore et al. (2014) has a sample of 119 firms implicated in a tax shelter and 
119 matched firms.  Of these 119 matched pairs, there are 7 matched pairs for which 
executives in both firms of the matched pair left the firm, worked at another firm, and 
are in Execucomp.  Of the executives associated with the tax shelter firms, 22.2 percent 
were promoted (Promote = 1) and 55.6 percent were demoted (Demote = 1).46  Of the 
matched executives, 20.0 percent were promoted and 10.0 percent were demoted.  The 
demotion percentage was significantly larger for those associated with a tax shelter (p-
value < 0.05). 
 Of the 119 matched pairs from Gallemore et al. (2014), there are 51 matched 
pairs for which executives from both firms of the matched pair left the firm, did not 
work at another firm, and are in Execucomp.  Of these executives associated with tax 
                                                          
46 Demote equals one if the executive was a CEO at their first job but not at their second unless the second 
firm has at least twice the MVE as the first firm.  Also, Demote equals one if the executive remains in the 
same level of position (CEO or non-CEO) but moved to a firm with half the MVE as the first firm.  See 
Appendix A for more details. 
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shelter firms, 45.5 percent were forced out of the labor market (ForcedOut = 1).  Of the 
matched executives not associated with a tax shelter, 31.0 percent were forced out.  The 
difference between these two numbers is statistically significant (p-value < 0.05).  
Overall, these results suggest that executives associated with a tax shelter face negative 
labor market consequences.  These results are consistent with my main results (Table 3) 
and with executives influence on firm tax strategy signaling executive focus on non-core 
activities of the firm.  These results also suggest one consequence of a firm being 
implicated in a tax shelter, something Gallemore et al. (2014) were not able to identify 
even though a recent survey suggests that there should be some negative consequences 
(Graham et al. 2014). 
5.4 Direction of Executive Influence on Firm Tax Strategy 
My hypotheses do not differentiate between executives who increase or decrease 
a particular firm tax strategy, but instead just focus on those who influence firm tax 
strategy regardless of direction.  It could be the case that the labor market views 
executive influence on firm tax strategy differently depending on the direction of 
influence.  Accordingly, I split ExecInfluence into positive and negative influence.47  As 
shown in Column 1 of Table 6, I split SigGETR into positive and negative influence 
(PosGETR and NegGETR, respectively) among my full sample and find an insignificant 
coefficient regardless of direction (-0.1043, p-value > 0.10 for PosGETR and -0.0705, p-
value > 0.10 for NegGETR).  As shown in Column 2 of Table 6, I split SigCVGETR into 
                                                          
47 Of the executives influencing the level of firm tax strategy, 51 percent increase the level and 49 percent 
decrease the level.  Of the executives influencing the variation of firm tax strategy, 54 percent increase the 
variation and 46 percent decrease the variation. 
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positive and negative influence (PosCVGETR and NegCVGETR, respectively) and find 
a negative and significant coefficient regardless of the direction of influence on tax 
strategy (-0.5211, p-value < 0.01 for PosCVGETR and -0.4130, p-value < 0.05 for 
NegCVGETR).  Overall, these results are consistent with the labor market responding to 
executives focusing on non-core activities and not to possible cash or firm performance 
outcomes of a particular tax strategy. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
 In this paper, I examine whether executive influence on firm tax strategy has 
labor market consequences.  Prior research has shown that executives influence firm tax 
strategy (Dyreng et al. 2010), but does not examine whether there are any consequences 
to these executives because of their influence on firm tax strategy.  I hypothesize that 
executive influence on firm tax strategy could signal to the labor market that executives 
are not focusing on core-activities of the firm.  Alternatively, executive influence on firm 
tax strategy could signal that executives are maximizing the return to shareholders using 
all tools available to them.  Further, executive influence on firm tax strategy may not be 
considered unless there is uncertainty regarding the performance and characteristics of 
the executive. 
 My results suggest that executives who influence the variation of firm tax 
strategy face negative labor market consequences, which is consistent with the idea that 
executives who influence firm tax strategy are viewed as focusing on non-core activities 
of the firm.  Further, my results are stronger among executives whose performance and 
characteristics are uncertain to the labor market.  In additional analysis, I demonstrate 
that my results hold with alternative methods of estimating executive influence on firm 
tax strategy and alternative measures of labor market consequences.  I also demonstrate 
that executives who influence the decision to lease or buy assets, an alternative non-core 
activity, also face negative labor market consequences. 
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 This paper furthers our understanding of firm tax strategy and executive 
influence on firm tax strategy.  By examining the labor market consequences of 
executive influence on firm tax strategy, I show executive influence on firm tax strategy 
is generally viewed negatively by the labor market.  This furthers our understanding of 
the role executives play in firm tax strategy by suggesting that executives who influence 
firm tax strategy are not focusing on the core activities of the firm.  Also, this shows that 
executives who influence firm tax strategy are doing so because of idiosyncratic 
differences and not just differences in incentives.  This paper also furthers the growing 
literature examining the consequences of firm tax strategy.  I am able to show one 
consequences of firm tax strategy: that executives who influence firm tax strategy face 
negative labor market consequences. 
 Finally, this paper furthers our understanding of the executive labor market.  By 
showing that the executive labor market responds differently to executives who 
influence firm tax strategy while holding firm performance constant, I show that the 
executive labor market cares not just how successful an executive is but also the process 
the executive uses to gain that success.  I also provide empirical support for the idea that 
executives face negative labor market consequences when focusing on non-core 
activities.  
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS (ALPHABETICAL) 
 
Variable Definition 
Advertising Advertising expense (adx) scaled by net sales (sale). 
Association 
An indicator variable equal to one if the executive has been a part of a 
professional association per BoardEx as this is a signal of executive social 
connections. 
Background 
An indicator variable equal to one if the executive has a background, 
whether work related or academic, in accounting or finance per BoardEx. 
Capex 
Capital expenditures (capx) scaled by gross property, plant, and equipment 
(ppeg). 
CVGETR 
The coefficient of variation of the GAAP effective tax rate.  CVGETR is 
calculated over a three year period from year t-2 to year t and is the 
standard deviation of the ratio of total income tax expense divided by 
pretax book income all divided by the mean of the same ratio, total income 
tax expense dived by pretax book income (McGuire et al. 2013). 
Connections 
The number of boards of directors of public companies that the executive 
has sat on per BoardEx.  This data is not available for all years in my 
sample.  Accordingly, I cannot match this to the number of boards the 
executive had been on when the labor market was examining them.  
However, as these numbers are very sticky and I want a consistent 
measurement, I measure this variable in 2014 for all executives.  In 
untabulated analysis, I find that my results are inferentially the same if I 
use the earliest data available (usually 2002) instead of 2014. 
CONTROL 
An array of control variables used in Equation (1), consisting of 
Advertising, Capex, OptionExpense, Foreign, Intangible, Leverage, Size, 
NOL, PPE, SGA, and R&D. 
Demote 
An indicator variable equal to one if the executive was demoted when 
changing jobs.  A job change is considered a demotion if the executive was 
a CEO at their first job but is not at their second job.  However, if the MVE 
of the first firm is less than half the MVE of the second firm, no longer 
being CEO is not considered a demotion.  I also consider the job move a 
demotion if the executive keeps a similar title (CEO or non-CEO) but is 
now working at a firm that is half the size or less of the first firm. 
Doctorate An indicator variable if the executive has a doctorate degree. 
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Elite 
An indicator variable equal to one if the executive attended an elite 
educational institution per BoardEx.  This is a proxy for information and 
social connections.  I define elite education institutions as those listed in 
the 2002 US News and World Reports top 20 universities, top 15 law 
schools, or top 15 business schools similar to prior research (Useem and 
Karabel 1986; Finkelstein 1992): Brown University, California Institute of 
Technology, Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, 
Duke University, Emory University, Georgetown University, Harvard 
University, Johns Hopkins University, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, New York University, Northwestern University, Princeton 
University, Rice University, Stanford University, University of California-
Berkeley, University of California-Los Angeles, University of Chicago, 
University of Michigan, University of Notre Dame, University of 
Pennsylvania, University of Texas at Austin, University of Virginia, 
Washington University in St. Louis, and Yale University. 
ETR 
The effective tax rate, a measure of firm tax strategy.  It is measured as 
either GETR or CVGETR. 
EXEC An array of executive fixed effects. 
ExecCharacteristics 
An array of executive characteristics control variable consisting of 
Connections, Age, Gender, Tenure, Masters, Doctorate, Association, Elite, 
Background, PriorCEO, and InternationalExp. 
ExecInfluence 
The influence an executive has on firm tax strategy.  Measured from 
estimates of executive fixed effects estimating Equation (1).  It consists of 
SigGETR when GETR is the dependent variable of Equation (1) and of 
SigCVGETR when CVGETR is the dependent variable of Equation (1). 
FIRM An array of firm fixed effects. 
FirmAge The number of years the firm has appeared in Compustat until year t. 
FirmCharacteristics 
An array of firm characteristic control variables consisting of ROA, 
MarketSize, and FirmAge. 
ForcedOut 
An indicator variable representing if the executive was forced out of the 
job market before age 60.  This is a cutoff commonly used in prior research 
(Engel et al. 2003; Brickley 2003). 
Foreign 
An indicator variable equal to one if the firm has positive foreign income 
(fi). 
Gender An indicator variable equal to one if the executive is female per BoardEx. 
GETR 
The GAAP effective tax rate.  Measured as total income tax expense (txt) 
scaled by pretax income (pi) less special items (spi).  Negative values are 
set to 0.  Values above 1 are set to 1. 
Intangible Intangible assets (intang) scaled by total assets (at). 
InternationalExp 
The natural log of the average international income (fi) over the past three 
years of the first firm the executive worked for. 
LeasePercent 
The ratio of total liabilities from capital leases (dclo) to total liabilities (dlc 
+ dltt). 
Leverage The ratio of total liabilities (dlc + dltt) to total assets (at). 
MarketSize The natural log of MVE. 
Masters 
An indicator variable equal to one if the executive has a masters or 
professional degree per BoardEx. 
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MVE 
The common share price at fiscal yearend (prcc_f) times the common 
shares outstanding used for basic earnings per share (cshpri). 
NegGETR 
Indicator variable equal to one if the executive has a significant influence 
on GETR (SigGETR = 1) and the fixed effect coefficient estimate from 
Equation (1) for that executive is negative. 
NegCVGETR 
Indicator variable equal to one if the executive has a significant influence 
on CVGETR (SigCVGETR = 1) and the fixed effect coefficient estimate 
from Equation (1) for that executive is negative. 
NOL 
An indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a positive tax loss 
carryforward value on their books (tlcf). 
Old 
Indicator variable equal to one if the executive during the last year at 
his/her first job was in the top tercile of age of executives during the last 
year at their first jobs.  Age is measured in years based on the executive 
birthdate in Execucomp with missing values being filled with the birthdate 
from BoardEx. 
OptionExpense 
Estimated option expense.  Calculated as the average annual value realized 
from exercise of options by executives ((optosby + optosey) / 2) divided by 
the percent of total options owned by executives (sum of options owned by 
executives from Execucomp / (optosey * 1000)) scaled by average assets 
(100 * (att−1 + att) / 2). 
PosGETR 
Indicator variable equal to one if the executive has a significant influence 
on GETR (SigGETR = 1) and the fixed effect coefficient estimate from 
Equation (1) for that executive is positive. 
PosCVGETR 
Indicator variable equal to one if the executive has a significant influence 
on CVGETR (SigCVGETR = 1) and the fixed effect coefficient estimate 
from Equation (1) for that executive is positive. 
PPE Gross property, plant, and equipment (ppeg) scaled by total assets (at). 
PriorCEO 
An indicator variable equal to one if the executive was a CEO at his or her 
first job per Execucomp. 
Promote 
An indicator variable equal to one if the executive was promoted when 
changing jobs.  A job change is considered a promotion if the executive is 
a CEO at the second job but was not at the first job.  However, if the MVE 
of the second firm is less than half the MVE of the first firm, becoming a 
CEO is not considered a promotion.  I also consider the job move a 
promotion if the executive keeps a similar title (CEO or non-CEO) but is 
now working at a firm that is at least twice the size of the first firm.  
Promote2 
An indicator variable equal to one if an executive was internally promoted 
to CEO from any other position (Magnusson and Boggs 2006). 
PT_ROA 
Pretax return on assets, measured as pretax income (pi) scaled by lagged 
total assets (at). 
R&D Research and development expense (xrd) scaled by net sales (sale). 
ROA Return on assets.  Measured as net income (ni) scaled by total assets (at). 
SGA 
Selling, general, and administrative expense (xsga) scaled by net sales 
(sale). 
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SigCVGETR 
Executives who have a significant influence on firm tax strategy as 
measured by CVGETR.  Measured as executives who have a statistically 
significant (p-value < 0.05) fixed effect when estimating Equation (1) with 
CVGETR as the dependent variable. 
SigGETR 
Executives who have a significant influence on firm tax strategy as 
measured by GETR.  Measured as executives who have a statistically 
significant (p-value < 0.05) fixed effect when estimating Equation (1) with 
GETR as the dependent variable. 
SigLease 
Executives who have a significant influence on the decision to lease or buy 
assets as measured by LeasePercent.  Measured as executives who have a 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.05) fixed effect when estimating 
Equation (1) with LeasePercent as the dependent variable. 
Size The natural log of total assets (at). 
Tenure 
The number of years the executive was listed at the first firm per 
Execucomp. 
Uncertain 
An indicator variable representing executives whose characteristics are 
uncertain in the labor market.  It is equal to one if Connections is equal to 
zero. 
YEAR An array of year fixed effects. 
Young 
Indicator variable equal to one if the executive at the last year at his/her 
first job was in the bottom tercile of age of executives in the last year at 
their first jobs.  Age is measured in years based on the executive birthdate 
in Execucomp with missing values being filled with the birthdate from 
BoardEx. 
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APPENDIX B 
TABLES 
 
TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
Sample Criteria Executives 
Executives in Execucomp from 1992 – 2013 41,605 
  
Remove executives who do not work for at least   
   three years at 2 or more firms  -39,686 
Require fixed effect regression variables -132 
  
   Executives with fixed effect estimates 1,787 
  
Remove executives with concurrent jobs -121 
Remove executives at more than 2 jobs -111 
Require regression variables -159 
  
   Final Sample 1,396 
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TABLE 2 
Summary Statistics 
Panel A – Equation (1) Sample 
Variable n Mean StdDev 25th Pct 50th Pct 75th Pct 
GETR 28,784  0.302 0.161 0.231 0.329 0.379 
CVGETR 30,468  0.393 0.494 0.040 0.135 0.665 
Advertising 31,918  0.012 0.168 0.000 0.000 0.009 
Capex 31,918  0.126 0.110 0.064 0.097 0.154 
OptionExpense 31,918  0.007 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Foreign 31,918  0.451 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Intangible 31,918  0.147 0.181 0.000 0.071 0.235 
Leverage 31,918  0.250 0.215 0.090 0.232 0.360 
Size 31,918  7.627 1.797 6.387 7.553 8.849 
NOL 31,918  0.341 0.474 0.000 0.000 1.000 
PPE 31,918  0.561 0.413 0.228 0.476 0.825 
SGA 31,918  0.204 0.205 0.059 0.176 0.300 
R&D 31,918  0.046 1.352 0.000 0.000 0.031 
       
       
Panel B – Equation (2) Sample 
Variable n Mean StdDev 25th Pct 50th Pct 75th Pct 
Promote 1,396  0.436 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SigGETR 1,396  0.132 0.338 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SigCVGETR 1,396  0.259 0.438 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Connections 1,396  1.729 2.185 0.000 1.000 3.000 
Young 1,396  0.347 0.476 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Old 1,396  0.348 0.477 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Gender 1,396  0.055 0.228 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Tenure 1,396  5.403 2.631 3.000 5.000 7.000 
Masters 1,396  0.544 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Doctorate 1,396  0.037 0.188 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Association 1,396  0.256 0.436 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Elite 1,396  0.388 0.487 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Background 1,396  0.379 0.485 0.000 0.000 1.000 
PriorCEO 1,396  0.198 0.399 0.000 0.000 0.000 
InternationalExp 1,396  2.208 2.411 0.000 1.406 4.211 
MarketSize 1,396  7.680 1.721 6.562 7.675 8.779 
ROA 1,396  0.035 0.096 0.006 0.040 0.075 
FirmAge 1,396  28.415 17.192 12.000 26.000 46.000 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Summary Statistics 
Panel C – Means By Executive Influence 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) – (3) (2) – (3) (1) – (2) 
 
SigGETR 
= 1 
SigCVGETR 
= 1 
SigGETR 
= 0 
SigCVGETR 
= 0    
Variable n = 184 n = 361 n = 925    
Promote 0.435 0.385 0.457 -0.023  -0.072 ** 0.050  
SigGETR 1.000 0.205 0.000       
SigCVGETR 0.402 1.000 0.000       
Connections 2.179 1.684 1.659 0.520 *** 0.025  0.495 ** 
Young 0.342 0.332 0.356 -0.013  -0.023  0.010  
Old 0.375 0.346 0.348 0.027  -0.002  0.029  
Gender 0.022 0.047 0.063 -0.041 ** -0.016  -0.025  
Tenure 5.315 5.296 5.425 -0.110  -0.128  0.019  
Masters 0.587 0.560 0.534 0.053  0.026  0.027  
Doctorate 0.043 0.030 0.037 0.007  -0.006  0.013  
Association 0.250 0.249 0.252 -0.002  -0.003  0.001  
Elite 0.462 0.432 0.364 0.098 ** 0.068 ** 0.030  
Background 0.386 0.385 0.374 0.012  0.011  0.001  
PriorCEO 0.228 0.180 0.201 0.027  -0.021  0.048  
InternationalExp 2.405 2.105 2.203 0.202  -0.098  0.300  
MarketSize 7.575 7.461 7.754 -0.178  -0.293 *** 0.115  
ROA 0.027 0.020 0.042 -0.015 ** -0.022 *** 0.007  
FirmAge 27.005 27.247 28.925 -1.920  -1.679  -0.241  
Variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 and represents the significance of a two-tailed t-test difference of means. 
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TABLE 3 
Promotion and Executive Influence on Firm Tax Strategy 
Dependent Variable = Promote 
 (1) (2) 
SigGETR -0.0869  
 (0.614)  
SigCVGETR  -0.4692*** 
  (0.001) 
Connections 0.1012*** 0.1015*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Young 0.3045** 0.2869** 
 (0.036) (0.049) 
Old 0.0335 0.0297 
 (0.825) (0.845) 
Gender -0.0767 -0.0918 
 (0.760) (0.715) 
Tenure -0.0203 -0.0212 
 (0.394) (0.374) 
Masters 0.1764 0.1746 
 (0.196) (0.202) 
Doctorate 0.3908 0.3616 
 (0.212) (0.251) 
Association 0.2075 0.2117 
 (0.144) (0.137) 
Elite -0.1845 -0.1586 
 (0.186) (0.258) 
Background -0.1376 -0.1434 
 (0.301) (0.283) 
PriorCEO -0.7627*** -0.7820*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
InternationalExp 0.0198 0.0204 
 (0.488) (0.477) 
MarketSize -0.4621*** -0.4729*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -0.2362 -0.3917 
 (0.710) (0.542) 
FirmAge 0.0048 0.0045 
 (0.202) (0.233) 
Constant 3.0300*** 3.2416*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 1,396 1,396 
Area Under ROC Curve 0.709 0.715 
Goodness of Fit p-value 0.139 0.145 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10; p-values are included in parentheses. 
Results shown are from estimating Equation (2). 
Variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
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TABLE 4 
Executive Uncertainty, Promotion, and Executive Influence on Firm Tax Strategy 
Dependent Variable = Promote 
 
High Uncertainty               
(Uncertain = 1) 
Not High Uncertainty        
(Uncertain = 0) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
SigGETR -0.2483  
 
0.0396  
 (0.403)   (0.856)  
SigCVGETR  -0.7771***   -0.2981* 
  (0.001)   (0.091) 
Connections    0.0636* 0.0644* 
    (0.097) (0.092) 
Young 0.5100** 0.4927**  0.1551 0.1410 
 (0.026) (0.034)  (0.421) (0.465) 
Old 0.0946 0.1318  -0.0089 -0.0182 
 (0.704) (0.599)  (0.964) (0.926) 
Gender -0.1139 -0.0991  -0.0977 -0.1251 
 (0.778) (0.804)  (0.766) (0.704) 
Tenure -0.0287 -0.0280  -0.0087 -0.0097 
 (0.513) (0.526)  (0.765) (0.738) 
Masters 0.1883 0.2121  0.2132 0.2044 
 (0.417) (0.367)  (0.225) (0.246) 
Doctorate -0.6363 -0.7674  0.8592** 0.8549** 
 (0.340) (0.245)  (0.022) (0.023) 
Association -0.0104 0.0548  0.3488** 0.3398** 
 (0.970) (0.844)  (0.043) (0.049) 
Elite -0.3730 -0.3486  -0.0512 -0.0257 
 (0.146) (0.178)  (0.765) (0.881) 
Background -0.2164 -0.2686  -0.1136 -0.1145 
 (0.373) (0.275)  (0.493) (0.490) 
PriorCEO -0.0829 -0.1513  -1.0703*** -1.0772*** 
 (0.804) (0.655)  (0.000) (0.000) 
InternationalExp 0.0868* 0.0928*  -0.0233 -0.0230 
 (0.086) (0.069)  (0.511) (0.517) 
MarketSize -0.5240*** -0.5541***  -0.4666*** -0.4728*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -0.1705 -0.4455  -0.1272 -0.1945 
 (0.876) (0.687)  (0.875) (0.811) 
FirmAge 0.0092 0.0095  0.0010 0.0005 
 (0.135) (0.124)  (0.843) (0.922) 
Constant 3.1618*** 3.5215***  3.3622*** 3.5208*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 551 551  845 845 
Area Under ROC Curve 0.713 0.729  0.727 0.731 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10; p-values are included in parentheses. 
Results shown are from estimating Equation (2) splitting the sample upon Uncertain. 
Variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
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TABLE 5 
Executives Who Work for Only One Firm 
 
Dependent Variable = 
Promote2 
 Dependent Variable = 
ForcedOut 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
SigGETR -0.3695***   0.1169  
 (0.007)   (0.123)  
SigCVGETR  -0.2119**   0.1761*** 
  (0.048)   (0.004) 
Connections 0.6968*** 0.6958***  -0.1515*** -0.1507*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Young -0.2068* -0.2155*    
 (0.062) (0.051)    
Old 0.4601*** 0.4544***    
 (0.000) (0.000)    
Gender -1.0461*** -1.0468***  1.2200*** 1.2152*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Masters -0.1492 -0.1484  0.3612*** 0.3598*** 
 (0.125) (0.127)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Doctorate -0.6820*** -0.6751***  -0.3740*** -0.3793*** 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Association -0.0027 -0.0007  -0.1157* -0.1176* 
 (0.981) (0.995)  (0.087) (0.082) 
Elite -0.0044 -0.0128  -0.0886 -0.0856 
 (0.968) (0.906)  (0.184) (0.200) 
Background -0.6047*** -0.6079***  0.3679*** 0.3681*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
PriorCEO    -1.0560*** -1.0583*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
InternationalExp -0.0401** -0.0401**  -0.0028 -0.0034 
 (0.034) (0.033)  (0.801) (0.760) 
MarketSize -0.1494*** -0.1444***  0.0187 0.0189 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.302) (0.295) 
ROA -1.6309*** -1.5935***  -0.8705*** -0.8550*** 
 (0.002) (0.003)  (0.008) (0.009) 
FirmAge 0.0169*** 0.0168***  -0.0273*** -0.0271*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -1.9661*** -1.9977***  1.9819*** 1.9534*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 9,380 9,380  10,859 10,859 
Area Under ROC Curve 0.795 0.795  0.719 0.719 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10; p-values are included in parentheses. 
Results shown are from estimating Equation (2) with various alternative dependent variables as 
noted in the table using samples created using an alternative method to estimate executive 
influence on firm tax strategy. 
PriorCEO (Young and Old) is not included as a control variable when Promote2 (ForcedOut) is 
the dependent variable because it is used to create the dependent variable. 
Variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
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TABLE 6 
Executives with a Positive or Negative Influence on Firm Tax Strategy 
Dependent Variable = Promote 
 (1)  (2) 
PosGETR -0.1043 PosCVGETR -0.5211*** 
 (0.662)  (0.003) 
NegGETR -0.0705 NegCVGETR -0.4130** 
 (0.761)  (0.024) 
Connections 0.1012*** Connections 0.1009*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Young 0.3046** Young 0.2861** 
 (0.036)  (0.050) 
Old 0.0338 Old 0.0309 
 (0.823)  (0.839) 
Gender -0.0777 Gender -0.0926 
 (0.757)  (0.712) 
Tenure -0.0203 Tenure -0.0218 
 (0.394)  (0.361) 
Masters 0.1766 Masters 0.1747 
 (0.196)  (0.202) 
Doctorate 0.3916 Doctorate 0.3638 
 (0.212)  (0.248) 
Association 0.2080 Association 0.2117 
 (0.143)  (0.137) 
Elite -0.1847 Elite -0.1571 
 (0.186)  (0.263) 
Background -0.1374 Background -0.1428 
 (0.301)  (0.285) 
PriorCEO -0.7623*** PriorCEO -0.7802*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
InternationalExp 0.0199 InternationalExp 0.0207 
 (0.486)  (0.469) 
MarketSize -0.4621*** MarketSize -0.4722*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
ROA -0.2345 ROA -0.4240 
 (0.712)  (0.512) 
FirmAge 0.0048 FirmAge 0.0045 
 (0.205)  (0.236) 
Constant 3.0302*** Constant 3.2408*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations 1,396 Observations 1,396 
Area Under ROC Curve 0.709 Area Under ROC Curve 0.715 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10; p-values are included in parentheses.  
Results shown are from estimating Equation (2) splitting ExecInfluence into positive and negative 
influence. 
Variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
 
